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INTRODUCTION
There is now a large theoretical and empirical literature in economics on inequality of opportunity (IOp) 1 , which evolved out of writings in political philosophy, beginning with John Rawls and extending through the present time. In one prominent formulation (Roemer 1993 (Roemer , 1998 , outcomes that individuals enjoy (such as income) are consequences of two sorts of factor: Circumstances, those characteristics of a person and her environment that are beyond her control or for which she should not be held responsible, and effort, which comprises those choices within her realm of control. Equality of opportunity is said to hold when the chances that individuals face for achieving the outcome in question are independent of their circumstances, and sensitive only to personal effort. The empirical literature measures the extent of IOp for various outcomes (income, wages, health) in many countries. 2 Almost all empirical studies estimate that the extent to which inequality of income is due to circumstances is quite small. Since it is this part of inequality that is ethically disturbing, the implication might be drawn that existing inequality of income is ethically acceptable, being due mostly to differential effort. Indeed, Kanbur and Wagstaff (2014) have recently argued that equality-of-opportunity studies may be doing more harm than good, because they could be used by policymakers in developing countries to argue that most income inequality is ethically acceptable, and social policy need not be concerned with reducing it.
We believe that the equal-opportunity approach based on the dichotomy between circumstances and effort is valuable, as it is based upon sound philosophical principles.
Moreover, surveys routinely find that most people agree with the principle that inequalities due to circumstances should be rectified by social policy. Indeed preferences for redistribution are systematically correlated with beliefs about the relative importance of effort and luck in the determination of outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano 2011) . Individuals are more willing to accept income differences that are due to effort (or laziness/industriousness) rather than to exogenous circumstances (e.g., Fong 2001 ).
However, we also believe that previous measurements of IOp are inadequate. Many important circumstances that play a causal role in income determination have been ignored in the empirical literature. The effects of these circumstances appear statistically as effort, because effort is often measured as the residual cause of income variation after explicit circumstances have been accounted for. Hence, the measurement of IOp is biased downward, perhaps seriously so (see the simulations in Bourguignon et al., 2007 and the discussions in Gignoux, 2011 and Niehues and Peichl, 2014) .
In this paper we make use of high-quality micro-panel data to correct this shortcoming. In particular we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70) to construct fine-grained sets of circumstance that take account of both the social environment of children and their cognitive and non-cognitive achievements during childhood.
The central issue we must confront is what aspects of the child's environment and performance should be deemed as comprising, or due to, circumstances. We take what some might find to be a radical position: That all measurable achievements and behaviors of children before an age of consent is attained are due to circumstances. We believe that children should not be held responsible for any of their accomplishments before that age. Indeed, we could take a cue from the law and use the sexual age of consent, or the age at which a child is judged to be an adult in a court of law to be the age of consent for responsible choice. Ideally, if we had a complete biography of the child at the age of, say, sixteen, we would consider that to comprise the child's circumstances.
In particular, we need not distinguish between the effects of nature and nurture: A child's genetic and somatic make-up is certainly a circumstance. Some may object to this, viewing the child as deserving to benefit from his or her innate traits. We demur -at least we do not believe a person deserves a higher income because he or she has valuable personal traits. This does not mean we would begrudge talented people the satisfaction they enjoy from being beautiful, intelligent or charming. But our study here concerns equality of opportunity for income, not life satisfaction, and we do not countenance the view that those desirable traits should command a more generous material condition. Naturally, this implies that equalizing opportunities for incomes must -to some degree at least -conflict with the reward structure of market economies.
Our analysis shows a significant increase of IOp measures when we expand the set of circumstances to include the attributes of the individual and her environment as a child. We find that the fraction of income inequality explained by circumstances to be 45.7% using the NLSY79 and up to 31.8% in the BCS70. These baselines estimates increase further when allowing for heterogeneous effects of circumstances on income.
In section 2, we present our conceptual framework and methodology. Section 3 provides some intuition on the potential role of circumstances in explaining income determination, section 4 describes the data sets, section 5 displays our results, and section 6 concludes.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
The main outcome of interest in this study is individual primary income . One measurement of the extent of income inequality due to circumstances is defined as follows. Consider the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) of an income distribution ( ). ( ) captures the total inequality of outcomes (IO). Let us suppose we have partitioned the population into types, each type corresponding to the set of individuals with given circumstances. Each type is characterized by its own income distribution. Let the type distributions be { ( ), } where is the set of types, and let type have frequency in the population and mean income , summarized by the vectors = 1 , … , and = 1 , … , . We can construct a hypothetical distribution, denoted by ( , ) , in which all members of each type receive the mean income of that type. ( , ) has a cumulative distribution function that is a step function, with as many steps as types; it is often called the 'smoothed' distribution of associated with the typology ( , ). If ( , ) were the true income distribution, we would say that all inequality is due to circumstances, and none to effort. The MLD of total inequality IO is decomposable as follows:
It is this decomposition that accounts for the popularity of the MLD, for we can interpret the first term on the right-hand side of (1) as the inequality due to circumstances, and the second as the inequality due to differential effort. Therefore, the ratio
is a measure of the extent to which income inequality is due to circumstances.
The disturbing result we mentioned earlier is that, using popular data sets, which record information on a limited set of circumstances, one finds that the measured value of is quite small -far less than one-half -especially in the highly developed countries (Brunori et al. 2013) . Is it, then, really the case that much more than half of income inequality is due to differential effort, as these results would suggest, or are we seriously underestimating the effect of circumstances, due to poor data sets?
The approach that we have just summarized, using the MLD decomposition, is non- We follow Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) and Niehues and Peichl (2014) who use a parametric specification to estimate lower bounds of IOp. The empirical specification reads
and can be estimated by OLS to derive the fraction of variance that is explained by circumstances. In this reduced form, the estimates measure the overall effect of circumstances on earnings, including the indirect effect of type-specific effort heterogeneity. Based on this estimation, we can construct a parametric estimate of the smoothed distribution defined earlier by replacing earnings outcomes by their predictions:
.
We then let be the distribution of these estimated incomes. In this counterfactual, all individuals with the same circumstances necessarily have the same incomes. Thus, in the case where all income differences are due to circumstances (and so the error terms in (2) are all zero), the ratio would be unity. Thus can be rewritten as:
Practitioners recognize that this procedure leads to lower bound estimates of the true share of inequalities due to circumstances. The intuition for this is just like that of an 2 -measure (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011) : Adding another circumstance variable to the analysis increases the explained variation (or at least does not decrease it in the case it is orthogonal), and hence the share of inequality due to circumstances cannot decrease although coefficients might be upward or downward biased. However, usually not all potential circumstances are observable in the data. Therefore, the extent of this underestimation bias is unclear.
Moreover, circumstances, taken from typical data sets, often appear to explain very little of the inequality in the aggregate distribution of income. Roemer (2015) Roemer (2015) shows that the supports of the type distributions resulting in a maximal are mutually disjoint. However, this is typically not the case in reality. Instead, the supports of the type distributions are very much overlapping -and very far from being disjoint. 3 This observation suggests that to get relatively large values of , we need circumstances that define types with the property that there are many subsets of types that share very little income mass.
Usually this is not the case when we use the common circumstances of parental education, occupation, race, or region of the country. Put another way, market economies do a pretty good job of equalizing opportunities for income acquisition, if we define the typology to be sufficiently coarse.
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III. DATA
For our empirical analysis, we use two data sets, NLSY79 and BCS70, which are described in turn after a short overview of the different circumstance sets that we are using.
A.
Sets of circumstances
The empirical analysis comprises several scenarios including different sets of explanatory variables beyond the individual's control. We grouped the explanatory variables into meaningful subsets by topics. There is a base scenario and five further specifications. The base scenario is chosen to include the circumstances most commonly used in the literature (such as parental background and ethnic origin) whereas the other scenarios include more detailed childhood outcomes unique to the data at hand and novel to this literature. While scenarios one to five feature a certain degree of comparability between NLSY79 and BCS70, the sixth circumstance sets comprise variables unique to the respective data sets. Our base scenario comprises a set of basic demographic characteristics of the respondents.
In particular, we included dummies for sex, race, country of birth, ethnic group and the respondent's cohort in order to take account of generational effects. Furthermore, we control for maternal educational achievement by including indicator variables for different academic degrees grouped in three categories of increasing rank. To be sure, we restrict ourselves to degrees attained before the child reaches the age of 16 in order to rule out feedback loops from child behavior beyond the responsibility cut-off. Similarly, we introduce a battery of occupation dummies for the mother, which are measured at the child age of 14. To further refine our account of the child's socio-economic background we employ net family income averaged over all periods of observation from birth until the age of consent. Neighborhood characteristics are introduced by dummy variables for whether the child lives in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), i.e. a core urban area with a population of 50,000 or more, and if yes whether its residence is located in the center of such an area. Lastly, we include child height recorded at the age of 16.
The second scenario makes use of the availability of academic achievement tests in the NLSY79 Child/YA in order to proxy for the child's ability. Ability at age 16 or younger is assumed to be beyond personal control and hence can be interpreted as a circumstance. A common approximation of ability is the use of standardized test scores. Specifically, at this stage we include the standardized score of the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) in the areas of mathematics and reading recognition. PIATs are widely-used measures of academic achievement credited with high test-retest reliability and concurrent validity. As we can draw on multiple rounds of PIATs for each observation we have averaged all respective scores over the age range 0-16 in order to cushion the influence of outlier test results. Note that we abstain from including further proxies of child ability at this stage in order to maintain comparability with the BCS70. They will, however, be integrated in a later scenario.
Thirdly, we include the total percentile score of the Behavioral Problems Index (BPI) among the circumstance variables. The BPI is an aggregate measure of child behavior and attitudes constructed from a series of 28 questions to mothers of children between four and 14 years of age. Again we make use of the availability of multiple test scores for each child by averaging over the relevant age range.
Scenario 4 extends the scope of circumstances to the child-parent relationship. In particular we take account of the family status of parents by controlling for the share of years parents did not live in the same household conditional on the fact that both were alive. Moreover, we took averages of the child's responses on whether parents spent time with them on schoolwork or engaged with them in activities of another kind. Lastly, a set of dummy variables is used to mirror the child's wish to spend more or less time with each of its parents at the age of 14.
Subsequently, we focus on health-related information for both children and parents in scenario 5. As regards the former, we make use of mothers' assessment on whether their child was restricted in school participation, schoolwork, or leisure activities due to a medical condition. Again we average these reports over the relevant age range. With respect to parental behavior we are confined to maternal information. Therefore we include a dummy variable for whether the respective child has ever been exposed to a mother smoking on a daily basis.
Additionally, we take account of the consumption of alcoholic beverages by including indicator variables for monthly drinking frequencies measured at the child age of eight. It is noteworthy that the integration of variables on maternal health behaviors yields important sample size reductions. Therefore, we will also consider an alternative reduced set of health-related information by exclusively focusing on the child's restrictions induced by medical conditions.
Lastly, we augment the circumstance set considered thus far by a host of variables that are specific to the NLSY79 and have no analogues in the BCS70. First, at the level of educational background we include a binary indicator for whether the child attends a public school.
Moreover, four variables are introduced that measure the average number of persons with a certain educational level in the household over the relevant age range from birth to 16. The considered levels are "Less than 12 years", "12-13 years", "13-15 years" and ">15 years". We furthermore exploit the fact that all NLSY79 respondents were subjected to an Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) at the beginning of the study. Thus, we are able to include the mother's AFQT-score as a proxy variable for maternal intelligence. Second, we aim to refine the ability measures of children by including the PIAT-score for Reading Comprehension and the Memory for Digit Span assessment. The digit span test is a measure of intelligence with particular focus on short-term memory. Third, we introduce a battery of average assessment scores on psychological dispositions of the children in the sample. These encompass the selfperception of children with respect to self-worth and scholastic performance as well as temperament assessments as regards child compliance, insecurity, and sociability. Similarly, NLSY79 conducted psychometric assessments with every respondent at the beginning of the study. As a result we are able to include the Pearlin Mastery Scale, Rotter's Locus of Control
Scale and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale at the level of mothers. The first two scores measure the extent to which respondents perceive themselves to be in control of forces that impact their lives. As its name suggests, the Rosenberg score can be interpreted as a measure of self-esteem. Lastly, socio-economic background variables of the circumstance set are enriched by a binary indicator on whether the mother ever was convicted of a crime and a home inventory score based on a test administered to children and mothers. Specifically, the latter measure assesses the quality of a child's home environment with sub-scores focusing on the extent of cognitive stimulation and emotional support. scores, health records, nutrition and activity diaries as well as labor market histories. Thereby, the BCS70 has collected information on health, physical, educational and social development, and economic circumstances. The data set contains detailed information on early childhood and parental background. In contrast to NLSY79, questionnaires are filled by both parents, revealing broader information on parental background. Moreover, similar and identical questions on family and social situation are addressed to parents and children.
The baseline scenario covers basic demographic and parental background variables. We include dummies for gender and foreign origin, defined by the birthplace of the father.
Furthermore, we define four categories of academic achievement of the father, "no degree", "secondary", "intermediate", and "college", where the first category serves as the omitted variable. In the same way, we include six occupational categories for the father, with the bluecollar group used as the omitted baseline case. In order to account for the socio-economic background of the child, we use the childhood urbanization degree and the parental income over the childhood as explanatory variables. Urbanization is measured by three dummies, grouping rural, suburbs/towns, and inner urban areas at the age of ten. Parental income is measured at ages 10 and 16 and classified into seven to eleven groups. Finally, we use the body height of the individual at age 10. we use in the data set specific scenario 6 in order to maintain comparability with the NLSY79
for scenario 3.
The fourth scenario deals with detailed information on family background. The time spent with the parents might affect the character of the individual. Therefore, we use the average time spent with the parents in a week as stated by the child at age 16. It is classified into 5 groups, from most days a week to little or never. In addition, we utilize the questions on common indoor or outdoor hobbies shared with the parents. It is noteworthy that one could further extend the circumstance set to the kind of common activities, household duties or personal relationships with the parents. As a final part of this scenario, we include the marital status of the parents at birth, categorized into "single", "partnership", "separated", and "widowed".
Scenario five deals with health and medical conditions of individuals and parents during childhood. The BCS70 contains detailed information on the smoking and drinking habits of parents, such that we can use both sets of information at age 16, categorized into six groups from "never" to "every or most days". In addition, we include the medical condition of the child at age ten, stating whether the child experienced no, slight, or severe medical conditions up to this age.
Finally, scenario six consists of further variables available in the BCS70 but we refrained from using in the previous scenarios to maintain comparability with the NLSY79. As a starting point, we include further ability measures at age five for picture and reading scores, malaise and Rutters behavior test scores for the parents as well as additional information on the education of the father. In addition, we utilize further variables provided by the BCS70. These include information on the school type, especially whether a grammar school was attended.
Moreover, we use information on the vaccination status of children at age five. Finally, we add a variable stating whether up to age five the child was raised primarily at home or in a childcare facility. However, the BCS70 offers a huge variety of variables that are of potential interest. In view of the small sample sizes, we refrain from using some of this information due to limitations in the available degrees of freedom.
IV. RESULTS
A. NLSY79
As outlined previously, the observational units covered by the NLSY79 span a wide time range. While the first children born to NLSY79 mothers were born as early as 1970, the latest birth we observe dates 1997. Therefore, a choice has to be made of how to treat the variance in
age. In what follows, we offer three approaches. First, we implicitly control for age by measuring the outcome of interest at a specific age threshold. For instance, we use the primary income of person at age 25 as the left-hand-side variable in equation (2), and then control for the respective cohort effects in the circumstance set. Figure 1 shows the results for different ages between 25 and 30 as well as for average income over this period for scenario 5. Depending on the age, circumstances account for between 35% and 53% of total inequality. However, as suggested by Figure 1 , this approach leads to very small sample sizes towards the age threshold of 30, which is commonly assumed to be a strong predictor of long-term earning potentials (Chetty et al. 2014) . Therefore, we alternatively use the average income over the age range 25-30 (Figure 2 ). This approach strikes a balance between the ambition to maintain a reasonably sized sample and to cushion the effect of outlier incomes of younger cohorts, who are at the beginning of their careers. Lastly, we pool all observations and control for both age and cohort effects in the circumstance sets (Figure 4 ).
Using the averaged outcome variable, Figure 2 gives an overview of how our IOp estimates vary as we sequentially introduce the circumstance sets laid out in Table 1 . First of all it is noteworthy, that inequality in the US is higher according to this sample than in comparison to other works. Pistolesi (2009) To examine whether this result is driven by the relatively small sample size, we retailor the circumstance sets. In particular, we exclude all variables on drinking and smoking behaviors of the mother, which are sparsely populated in the NLSY79. Excluding these variables yields a doubling of the sample size. As health-related information is only introduced in scenario 5, we can compare the first four scenarios in Figure 2 and Figure 3 to observe a difference of around 10 percentage points depending on the sample under consideration. In a last step we pool all variables and control for age and cohort in the circumstance set.
The sample is balanced on the sixth circumstance set and thus should be compared to So far, we have introduced the circumstances only linearly. However, the effect of circumstances on income could be heterogeneous across types. To analyze this, we introduce two additional scenarios. While the circumstance set remains the same as in scenario 6, we introduce additional type heterogeneity by allowing all circumstance coefficients to vary across age (Scenario 7) and combined age-sex cells (Scenario 8). This is implemented by interacting all circumstances with age, and age and sex respectively. 4
The resulting increase of to almost 66% is impressive and highlights the importance of taking seriously the differential impact of single circumstances across types. 5 Alternatively, we fully interact the circumstance variables on sex, country of birth, ethnic, the rural/urban divide and maternal academic achievement in the base scenario and then sequentially introduce all other circumstances as outlined in the previous discussion. The results (Appendix 3) indicate a doubling of in the first scenario, while the subsequent increase by 10.1 percentage points until scenario six is only slightly lower in absolute terms than the increase portrayed in Figure 4 (12 percentage points). Thus, the introduction of heterogeneous effects across types does not merely capture variation that is reflected in other circumstances, but provides an independent upwards correction of lower bound IOp estimates.
B. The British Cohort Study
In contrast to the NLSY79, the BCS70 only observes one cohort of individuals. Therefore, dealing with the variance in age is relatively straightforward. We observe individual net earnings from 2000 to 2012 (age 30 to 42), in 4-year steps. Using the annual information as well as average earnings over the whole period, we are able to cover a period of 12 years, including early employment time as well as individuals of age 30 to 40. The sample size is relatively constant for all years, indicating a small dropout rate and sound data quality. First, we run separate regressions for each year and a regression for average income using circumstance set specification five, which is still comparable to NLSY79. of interactions among the circumstances will be manifest in the income distribution of the type. The linear, parametric estimation of income, which is used in scenarios 1 through 6 is clearly capturing none of the interaction effects of the circumstances, and so scenarios 7 and 8 bring us somewhat closer to an approximation of the non-parametric approach (e.g. . 5 See Hufe and Peichl (2015) for a more thorough discussion of the role of interaction terms in parametric lower bound estimations of IOp.
As the BCS70 carries information on primary and net income, we use these numbers to compare IOp before and after taxes and transfers. By restricting the sample to those individuals with valid data on both income definitions, we lose some observations but ensure comparability in the results. The main finding is that IO is higher in primary terms, but is actually lower in primary income considering average income over ages 30 to 42. However, the level of IOp is higher in primary earnings. Nevertheless, we find that adding the specific circumstance variables yields an even higher of now 35.9% in primary and 42.5% in net income.
In a second analysis, we pool the data from different cohorts and explicitly control for age in the regression. Similarly to the analysis of the NLSY79, the relative share declines for all scenarios due to the increase in IO, taking them closer to the results of previous studies.
Nevertheless, with an of 28.6% and 33.6% in the sixth circumstance set, they are still up to 8 (13) percentage points higher compared to the results of Checchi et al. (2010) in primary (net) terms. behaviors and accomplishments of children should be considered the consequence of circumstances: That is, an individual should not be held responsible for her choices before an age of consent is reached. In rich societies, it is appropriate to choose the age of consent as occurring no earlier than adolescence. Ideally, if we had a complete biography of the child at the age of, say, sixteen, we would consider that to comprise the child's circumstances.
The credulous reader might well ask, "Well, if you take the complete biography of the child at the age of consent as comprising her circumstances, where can effort play a role? After all, the choices the adult makes will be strongly influenced by her 'biography' at age sixteen." We agree, and that is why we believe circumstances account for a far larger fraction of outcome inequality than studies to date have calculated. Nevertheless, we resist the response that would decrease the age of consent to something like four or six years of age. Perhaps thirteen, as in the Jewish religion, would be acceptable -although one must ponder the fact that thirteen was acclaimed as the beginning of adulthood when life expectancies were barely onethird of what they are now, and the resources society had to allocate to children were far less.
In any case, our data sets are not sufficiently fine-grained to make these distinctions. Even if one prefers thirteen to sixteen, it is probably better to include achievements at age sixteen as circumstances when the complete biography at age thirteen is unavailable.
Using the NLSY79 and the BCS70, we construct fine-grained sets of circumstance that take account of both the social environment of children and their childhood accomplishments, to compute the fraction of income inequality due to circumstances in the US as well as the UK. Our analysis shows a significant increase of IOp measures when we expand the set of circumstances to include the attributes of the individual and her environment as a child. We find that the fraction of income inequality explained by circumstances to be 45.7% using the NLSY79 and up to 31.8% in the BCS70. These baseline estimates increase substantially when allowing for heterogeneous effects of circumstances on income.
Our findings suggest revisiting the sets of circumstances used in previous studies, as the results we obtained indicate substantially higher IOp when taking into account additional childhood information. In fact, extending circumstance sets by childhood achievements before an age of consent addresses some of the concerns on the policy relevance of the concept by providing substantial upward corrections of lower bound measures of IOp. Obviously, in many country contexts data limitations impose strong restrictions on the ability of applied researchers to conduct analyses as detailed as ours for the US and the UK. To address this problem, it could be one avenue for future research to combine different data sets for calculations of IOp. For instance, one might use a first data set with detailed information on circumstances to predict childhood accomplishments of different types. In a second step one could then use these intermediate types as circumstances in a second data set to calculate a measure of IOp. Such a procedure would be one promising route to overcome data limitations and enhance the data basis for analyses on IOp. 
